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a call to
collective
bargaining
The following essay is taken from "The Once
and Future Labor Act: Myths and Realities,"
delivered last May in Washington, D.C., as
the third annual lecture to the College of
Labor and Employment Lawyers. Previous
lectures in the series were delivered by Abner
J. Mikva, former White House counsel and
retired chief judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
and Judge Richard A. Posner, chief judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Chicago.

A century ago the legal specialty of
most members of this audience would
have been known as Master and
Servant Law. By the time my
generation entered law school, the
Decennial Digest had just added a new
topic - Labor Relations Law. That of
course dealt with collective bargaining
and union-management relations
generally. Now, a half century further
along, we might seem to have come
full circle, to judge by the lectures of
the two eminent jurists who
inaugurated this series. Both Abner
Mikva and Richard Posner spoke on
highly important and timely subjects,
and yet those would be classified, not
as Labor Law, but as Employment Law
-to use todays term - or even as
Master and Servant Law - the term
still employed by the Decennial Digest.
So today, at the risk of being a bit out
of fashion, I am going to return to the
past, and I hope the future as well,
and talk about the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).
The Congress that passed the
Wagner Act in 1935 was very different
from the post-World War II Congress
that passed the Taft-Hartley Act 12
years later. Nonetheless, I am satisfied
from my interviews and from my
reading of the legislative history that
the Supreme Courts statement in the
First National Maintenance case (1981)
could apply to either statute:
"Congress had no expectation that the
elected union representative would
become an equal partner in the
running of the business enterprise in
which the unions members are
employed."
What, then, did Senator Wagner
and the 1935 Congress have in mind?
I believe language in the Findings and
Policies of the original NLRA, which
was retained in the Taft-Hartley
amendments despite some vocal
opposition, got it right. The "policy of
Continued on page 96
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the United States" was declared to be
"encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining" and "protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own
choosing . .. ." If that was the aim,
however, something seems to have gone
terribly wrong during the past half century.
In the mid-1950s over 38 percent of
private nonagricultural employees were
unionized . Today that figure has slipped to
less that 10 percent - about one-quarter
of the percentage at the 1950s' peak, and a
little less than what it was on the eve of the
Wagner Act.

The decline of organized labor
The explanation for union decline is
surely multifactored: the shift of jobs from
the manufacturing to the service industries,
and from the unionized to the nonunionized
sections of the country; tighter legal
restraints imposed by the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin amendments to the
NLRA; an aging, complacent, and
unaggressive union leadership; and
perhaps a growing feeling among
employees that unionization is no longer
necessary in a time of economic prosperity
and enlightened management. Insofar as
workers may have knowingly and
voluntarily chosen to refrain from
organizing, of course, the National Labor
Relations Act is fulfilling its objective of
ensuring "full freedom of association" just
as if they had eagerly signed a union
authorization card. But there are facts that
give one pause about accepting such a
scenario as the whole story
At the same time that union membership
went into a nosedive in the private sector,
it was soaring in the public sector. The
percentage of government employees
represented by unions now stands at
4 2 percent - over four times the
percentage in private employment.
Included are many groups that would
formerly have been classified as
"unorganizable": school teachers, doctors,
lawy7ers, engineers, and other professional
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and technical employees. Once a state
legislature and a governor have authorized
unionization, it will be the rare agency
head who will strongly object. That does
make one wonder about the extent to
which employer opposition, and subtle or
not-so-subtle intimidation, may have
operated in the private sector.
Extrapolating from figures supplied by
Professor Paul Weiler, for example, I once
calculated that employer discrimination
against employees during union organizing
drives increased about four to six times
between the 1950s and the 1980s.
The situation is entirely different in
Western Europe, which historically has
been twice as organized, proportionately, as
the United States, and is now even more
so. There is a biting irony in this. Ours is
probably the most conservative, least
ideological of all labor movements,
traditionally committed to the capitalistic
system and to the principle that
management should have the primary
responsibility for managing. Yet American
business in the main has never been
accepting of unionization and collective
bargaining. In part this resistance may
result from the highly decentralized
character of American industrial relations.
An employer usually must confront a
union on a one-to-one basis, without the
security blanket of association bargaining
on behalf of all or substantially all the firms
in a particular industry, as is customary in
Western Europe. In part the resistance to
union organization may spring, among
both employers and employees, from
ingrained American attitudes of rugged
individualism and the ideal of the classless
society. As a corollary, many employers
resent, as an automatic reflex, any intrusion
on their total autonomy and flexibility in
running the enterprise.
In the somewhat atypical context of an
academic institution, I myself have been
the equivalent of a CEO. I have even
delivered a captive audience speech of
sorts, with one of my better labor law
students sitting in the audience and taking
notes to document any unfair labor
practices I might commit. Our clerical staff
was organized at one point but later the
union was decertified. I saw no adverse
impact on our operations under the
unionized regime. My secretarial director

commented that in at least one respect
unionization had its advantages. She could
deal with just one person to settle a
complaint, instead oLhaving to cope with a
number of individuals with often-diverging
views. John Dunlop may have phrased it
more elegantly, but essentially he made the
same point when he said: "A great deal of
the complexity and beauty of collective
bargaining involves the process of
compromise and assessment of priorities
within each side."
Certainly, employer aversion to
unionism can hardly be justified by a
dispassionate analysis of the actual impact
of collective bargaining in this country. The
consensus of labor economists is that
unionization cannot be proven to have
produced any substantial shift of corporate
income from capital to labor. Union
workers have obtained a wage level that is
10 to 20 percent higher than their
nonunion counterparts. But that differential
is largely offset by increased efficiency and
greater productivity in unionized firms.
Indeed, the major contribution of collective
bargaining is probably not economic at all.
It is the joint creation of the grievance and
arbitration system. The mere existence of
such procedures helps to eradicate such
former abuses as favoritism, arbitrary or illinformed decisionmaking, and outright
discrimination in the workplace.
From my own experience and from my
research and discussions with union and
management representatives, I would
further conclude that collective bargaining
has promoted both labor peace and
broader worker participation in improving
the quality of products and services offered
the public. Unilaterally or in conjunction
with unions, employers have sought
employee input through plans variously
denominated participative management,
quality of work life (QWL) programs, and
employee involvement. That is smart
business. The worker on the assembly line
will spot flaws that have escaped the eye of
the keenest industrial engineer. I suspect
some participative programs have been
adopted as union-avoidance devices. Yet

paradoxically, studies by Professor Thomas
Kochan of MIT and others find that a
strong union presence may be essential to
ensure the long-term survival and
continuing success of QWL undertakings.

The duty to bargain
In recommending ways to revise or
reinterpret the NLRA to better achieve its
underlying purposes, I would start with
what I regard as the Act's constructive
centerpiece, the duty to bargain collectively.
To realize the full potential of creative
negotiating, we should shed as much as
possible of the straitjacket imposed by the
famous Borg-Warner case (1958) . There the
Supreme Court accepted a rigid and
unrealistic dichotomy between mandatory
and permissive subjects of bargaining. The
parties are only required to bargain about
mandatory subjects (the statutorily
prescribed "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment"), and only
they may be the basis for an impasse or
deadlock in negotiations. I began my legal
career working with an able , tough-minded
management attorney who argued
Borg-Warner. Except for a client veto, he
would have urged that all lawful subjects
be mandatory. He believed that government
fiat should not control so basic and
individualized a question as the contract
issues a particular employer or union
deems important enough to back up with a
lockout or a strike.
Hypocrisy is encouraged and candor
reduced by the Borg-Warner formula.
A savvy party that urgently desires a
permissive subject in a contract can usually
bring negotiations to an artificial deadlock
over a legally sanctioned mandatory topic.
Experienced, sophisticated participants in a
mature, durable bargaining relationship do
not engage in such ploys to evade the law'.s
strained distinctions. If a union like the
United Auto Workers wishes to discuss
pension improvements for retired workers,
technically a nonmandatory subject, the
Big Three auto manufacturers discuss
them. Other veteran management lawyers
tell me similar stories. In those circumstances
the law is superfluous. Where legal
regulation is needed is for inexperienced or
hostile parties and immature, fragile

relationships. The time required for
bargaining should not be a serious
impediment to management's occasional
need for swift action. A sampling I once
made of NLRB cases indicated that
negotiations reached an impasse or
deadlock in a median period of six and
one-half weeks. After impasse, of course,
an employer may institute its proposed
terms unilaterally, without the consent of
the union.
Borg-Warner~ mandatory-permissive
rubric probably reflects a national
consensus that there is some untouchable
core of entrepreneurial and union
autonomy that is beyond the reach of
compulsory collective bargaining. An
outright overruling of Borg-Warner, either
judicially or legislatively, is therefore
unlikely even in a much more liberal
political climate than exists today. But at
least I think it would make for far healthier
and more responsible labor relations if the
duty to bargain encompassed, as the Labor
Board once declared, any employer action
that could effect a "significant impairment
of job tenure, employment security, or
reasonably anticipated work opportunities
for those in the bargaining unit." That
conclusion is adequately supported by the
language, legislative history, and policy of
the NLRA. The Supreme Court gave
qualified endorsement to the proposition in
Fibreboard Paper Products (1964) . Despite
the Courts subsequent retreat in First
National Maintenance (1981), sound
personnel policies alone would argue that
the broader scope of required bargaining
should ultimately prevail.
Collective bargaining is much more than
a means of allocating employee jobs and
compensation. Even a hard-headed labor
economist like Neil Chamberlain was
moved to say: "[T]he workers' struggle for
increasing participation in business
decisions . .. is highly charged with an
ethical content." For me, this moral
dimension of negotiations between unions
and management cannot be avoided,
because those negotiations determine the
nature of work in the shop. And it is
primarily work that defines a man or a
woman - that largely determines a
person's very identity. A thoughtful study
for the federal government has found that
"most, if not all, working people tend to

describe themselves in terms of the work
groups or organization to which they
belong. The question 'Who are you?' often
elicits an organizationally related response.
... Occupational role is usually a part of
the response for all classes: Tm a
steelworker,' or Tm a lawyer. '"

Union representation
Frustration over the increasing employer
resistance to unionization and the failure of
organizing efforts in recent years has led to
proposals for some major changes in the
law. These have included the certification
of unions on the basis of card checks,
"instant elections," and compulsory
arbitration of first contracts as a remedy for
employer refusals to bargain. While I
understand and sympathize with the
motivation behind these recommendations,
I am generally not happy with them.
The installation of a labor organization
as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees under Section 9(a) of the
NLRA is more than the unilateral choice of
an agent by a principal. It could be
described as a statutorily mandated shotgun
marriage, establishing an ongoing relationship
that will substantially alter the way an
employer must carry on its day-to-day
business. The union's decisions will also be
binding on dissenting employees, even
though they may constitute close to a
majority in the bargaining unit. Under
those circumstances it seems only fair that
the employer should have the opportunity
to get his side of the story across to the
employees before they vote . Denying the
employer that right might even raise
constitutional free speech issues. For those
reasons I would oppose instant elections or
automatic certification simply on the basis
of a card check. Compulsory arbitration of
first contracts, if limited to cases of
employers· flagrant refusals to bargain, is
more supportable. But it still cuts against as
basic a policy as we have in our labor law,
namely, freedom of contract. As expressed
by the Supreme Court in American National
Insurance (1952), it is not the function of
government to "sit in judgment upon the
substantive terms of collective bargaining
Continued on page 98
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agreements." The effect has been to
preclude the NLRB from imposing a
contract term even as the remedy for a
refusal to bargain by an employer.
Considerable controversy has been
generated over the nature and effects of
employer conduct during a union organizing
campaign. A quarter century ago , a
celebrated empirical study by Professors
Steve Goldberg and Jack Getman found
that employers' supposedly coercive tactics
did not "significantly" affect employees'
voting behavior. They therefore recommended
that the NLRB "cease regulating speech
and, for election purposes, nearly all
conduct." Separate sets of interviews by
Derek Bok and_myself with union
organizers indicated that they did not
believe most employer speeches were all
that intimidating. They insisted, however,
that the presence of management speakers
and the absence of union counterparts at
workplace forums conveyed a strong
message about the relative power of the
competing parties. In later years, the
Goldberg-Getman thesis has been vigorously
contested by most other observers. At one
time I was quite taken by the GoldbergGetman views, especially because they
paralleled my own investigations. But my
inquiries were made in the early '60s, and
that was a different world. I have also been
shaken by the statistics on the increasing
number of statutory violations by private
employers and by the sharply diverging
patterns of union organizing in the public
and private sectors.
I still see little sense in the board's
dithering over such employer comments
as, "I will fight the union in every legal way
possible .... I'll deal hard with it, I'll deal
cold with it. I'll deal at arm's length with
it." So I believe the board should get out of
the time-consuming, hair-splitting process
of scrutinizing the combatants' presentations
for evidence of misleading or vaguely
ominous statements. But all parties are
entitled to an election free of outright
discrimination or egregious threats, and the
board must continue to set aside elections
rife with serious misconduct or blatantly
coercive speech by either employers or
unions. I would also adopt one Goldberg-
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Getman recommendation that was at least
partially accepted by the Reagan-Bush
Labor Board, although ultimately rejected
by the Supreme Court in Lechmere (1992).
Under certain circumstances a union
'
should have access to an employer's premises
to counter management campaigning prior
to an election, particularly in larger
enterprises where employees disperse
widely at the end of the workday. The
plant or shop is the natural forum for
conveying views about unionization.
A party denied access is under a severe
handicap in trying to reach the voters.
That is truer in today's fragmented,
heterogeneous society than it ever was.
Although I am no fan of "instant
elections," the blunt reality is that prolonged
campaigns are an open invitation to
unscrupulous employers (or unions) to
engage in coercive activity. Maybe a
statutory time limit should be imposed on
the processing of the routine representation
case. Here a fair balance would have to be
struck between the employer's need,
especially the smaller or inexperienced
employer's need , to prepare and get its
message across to the workforce, and the
goal of preventing the tactics of "stall, delay,
and intimidate." The ill-fated Labor Reform
Bill of 1978, as passed by the House,
would have allowed a maximum of 25
days between the filing of the election
petition and the holding of the election.
That seems too short. An employer needs
at least a couple of weeks to prepare for a
board hearing. The 1978 House-passed
measure might have left only a week
between the regional director's direction of
an election and the election itself. Without
attempting to be too precise from my
academic, non-practicing perch, I would
suggest a maximum time in the ordinary
case about twice that prescribed by the
1978 bill between the petition and the
election - let's say around six or seven
weeks.
The NLRA has never provided for
general damages for injuries inflicted on
employees. The remedies for unfair labor
practices traditionally are cease-and-desist
orders and reinstatement with or without
back pay. Yet if an employer unlawfully
refuses to bargain with a majority union,
the employees are deprived of the benefits
negotiations might have produced, usually

including a wage increase. The conventional
remedy of an order to bargain operates
only prospectively and does nothing to
restore the months or ,years of financial loss
the employees may have suffered. At least
when the employer's violation is flagrant
and egregious, the NLRB should be able to
provide monetary relief. Remedies are the
lifeblood of rights, and the status quo sucks
much of the blood out of the fundamental
right to organize and bargain collectively.
At one point the D.C. Circuit seemed on
the verge of recognizing the validity of a
compensatory remedy for flagrant
violations, but then it grew fainthearted
and drew back.
Neither principle nor practical
calculation problems should stand in the
way of an appropriate monetary award in
these cases. A make-whole remedy would
not be a contract imposed on the parties by
the board; it would have no continuing
existence into the future. It would be a
form of back pay order, based on the
putative contract that could have resulted
from good-faith bargaining, discounted by
the chances that the parties would not have
reached agreement. The measure of the loss
would be derived from a composite of
union contracts in similar labor-management
relationships. Of course there is an element
of speculation here, but no more so than in
many contract, tort, or antitrust damage
awards. In other contexts we do not
hesitate to resolve such doubts against the
wrongdoer. This make-whole relief would
also be genuinely remedial and not punitive.
It would simply put in the employees'
pockets what the employer denied them by
its bad faith in refusing to bargain. I harbor
no illusions that my proposal is likely to be
embraced any time soon by the current
federal judiciary or by Congress. But it is
one of the most prized of academic
prerogatives that one can cavalierly dismiss
the unseeing present, and address oneself
to the far more receptive and sagacious
future.

Nonunion employee participation
Having espoused traditional union
organization up to this point, I think it
only fair to say a few words about another
and quite different development in this
country. A growing number of companies,
both large and small, especially in the new
high-tech industries and in the old
personal-service industries, are nonunion . I
have my suspicions about whether all their
employees have knowingly and voluntarily
rejected the opportunity to organize. But I
have no doubt that many of these workers,
wisely or otherwise, have freely chosen to
remain without union representation. Still,
their employers, if they have gone to the
right business schools, will wish to solicit
the workers' opinions and suggestions in a
systematic way And you can count on it
that some employer or employee will
eventually come up with the idea of a
formal "employee committee" to facilitate
the process. The company will be pleased
to provide an office and a typewriter, coffee
and doughnuts at joint meetings with
management, and even a note taker at the
meetings to see that the employees' views
and proposals are properly recorded and
transmitted to the company's higher-ups.
However congenial to the parties, most
of these arrangements are, under the strict
logic of NLRB precedent, violations of
Section 8(a)(2) of the labor Act. They
constitute illegal employer "domination" or
"assistance" of what is technically regarded
as a "labor organization." Fortunately, in
my opinion, some federal courts of appeals
have realized that Section 8(a)(2) was
aimed at quite different targets. Those were
the puppet-like sham "company unions" of
the 1930s and the employers who gave
preferential treatment to their favorite (the
less assertive and more malleable) as
between competing unions. If 21st century
employees have chosen freely and
knowingly and the committee or other
body acts truly on their behalf and for their
benefit, I see no reason for objection except
the dead hand of a long-distant past. While
I might believe the workers' interests
would be better served by a full-fledged
union and collective bargaining, that is not
my decision to make. Paternalistic
safeguards may have been necessary to

protect an uninformed and vulnerable
workforce against itself in the Depression
Era, but that would hardly seem the reality
today. Section 8(a)(2) should be liberally
construed or else amended to permit
nonunion employee participation in
management decisionmaking as long as it
is wholly voluntary

Conclusion
One of the truly great people of our
time is Monsignor George G. Higgins, the
famous "labor priest." For 25 years he was
the director of the Social Action Department of the United States Catholic
Conference, and for almost a half century
he chaired that unique experiment in
union democracy, the UAW's Public Review
Board. His achievements have not gone
unrecognized. This past year he added to
his many awards the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, the highest honor this country
can bestow upon a civilian. Yet despite his
eminence, it is entirely characteristic of the
man that he has devoted himself in recent
years to the betterment of agricultural
workers, those American "untouchables"
who do not enjoy the protections afforded
by the NLRA.
Monsignor Higgins is both a social
activist and a social thinker, steeped in the
teachings of the Papal encyclicals on the
condition of labor. Drawing upon those
social encyclicals, he has even been
prepared to suggest that working people
may often have a "certain moral obligation
to join a union. " An intellectual tradition
even older than Monsignor's, harking back
to Aristotle and the Greek philosophers,
holds that human beings are social and
political creatures, "whose nature is to live
with others." We are nearly all joiners. It is
not enough to have an ABA Section of
Labor and Employment law, which accepts
all comers. We must have a more selective
group, the College of labor and
Employment Lawyers. We want to be with
and work with our peers. ls it any wonder,
then, that Monsignor Higgins would enjoin
most working people to come together in
organizations capable of advancing their
common goals?
That, then, is for me the glory of the
Wagner Act. It was not designed to make
employees the equal partners of employers,

nor yet to pit the two groups against each
other in eternal combat. Rather, it
recognized the reality that at times their
differing concerns would lead to conflict,
but civilized conflict within appropriate
rules of engagement, and that at other
times their mutual interests would lead to
periods of extended cooperation. Only a
suicidal worker or deranged labor leader
seeks ill for the company that holds the
key to their economic wellbeing. In my
experience, management almost invariably
knows more about running the enterprise
than do the employees. But seldom if ever
does it know so much that it cannot learn
from them. Similarly, employees almost
invariably know more about what is good
for themselves than does the most
benevolent and well-intentioned of employers.
The situation begs for the interchange of
ideas and mutual accommodation in a
systematic fashion. I cannot believe that a
private-sector workforce that is only onetenth organized is ultimately good for
labor, for management, or for the whole of
our society. And so I look for a day when
the promise of the Wagner Act - that
workers may freely organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their
own choosing - is at long last fulfilled.
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